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Abstract
Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the franchise? This pa-
per develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We study properties
of dynamic enfranchisement games, dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time. Each
period, private decisions of citizens co-mingle with government policies to act upon a state variable
such as capital stock, a public good, or the likelihood of an insurrection. Policies are determined by
the median voter of a potentially restricted franchise. The enfranchised group can choose, through
its median voter, to expand the set of citizens with voting rights. In this way, each period’s median
voter can eﬀectively delegate decision authority to a new median in the next period. We characterize
the equilibria of a dynamic enfranchisement game by its Euler equations. In certain games, the
equilibria generate paths that display a gradual, sometimes uneven history of enfranchisement that
is roughly consistent with observed patterns of extensions. Our main result shows that extensions
of the franchise occur in a given period if and only if the private decisions of the citizenry have a
net positive spillover to the dynamic payoﬀ of the current median voter. The size of the extension
depends on the size of the spillover. Since the class of games we study can accommodate a number of
proposed explanations for franchise extension (e.g., the threat of insurrection, or ideological or class
conﬂict within the elite, etc), the result suggests a common causal mechanism for these seemingly
diﬀerent explanations. We describe a number of parametric environments that correspond to the
various explanations, and show how the mechanism works in each.
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1“There is no more invariable rule in the history of society. The further electoral
rights are extended, the greater the need for extending them; for after each con-
cession, the strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with
its strength."
Alexis de Tocqueville1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Voluntary expansion of political rights by a ruling elite is at ﬁrst glance paradoxical. The elite,
after all, dilutes its power when it extends these rights to others. Yet, signiﬁcant extensions
of the voting franchise took place in Europe throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Instances of franchise extensions date back, in fact, much further. The constitutional reforms
of Cleisthenes in 508 BC in Athens was arguably an early form of franchise extension.2 Another
early instance occurred in 494 BC, when the patricians in the early Roman Republic conceded
the right of the plebs (the "commoners") to participate in the election of magistrates.
This paper examines the determinants of franchise extension. We have two goals in mind.
First, rather than describing a speciﬁc, stylized model to "explain" the history of voting rights,
we propose a general framework in which competing explanations of franchise extention can
be usefully evaluated. The few existing models tend to diﬀerentiate themselves by whether
franchise extensions are modeled as externally (i.e., the threat of revolution) or internally (i.e.,
political competition between members of the elite) driven conﬂicts. We seek a "canonical"
framework that can accommodate, as special cases, the essential elements of most existing
models and existing explanations of the franchise. We review some of these later in Section
2. Second, we want a model which produces outcomes that are consistent, broadly speaking,
with the observations on franchise extensions. Though the "data" of enfranchisements are
often hard to interpret, we identify certain tendencies associated with many or most observed
extensions of rights. These observations are also discussed in Section 2.
To address these goals, we specify a class of dynamic games in which the set of eligible
voters is endogenously determined each period. We refer to these as dynamic enfranchisement
games. Dynamic enfranchisement games are dynamic games in which political rights evolve
as a fully dynamic recursive phenomenon.
Speciﬁcally, we posit a society of n inﬁnitely lived citizens. Each period, private decisions
of citizens co-mingle with a government policy to determine the value of an "economic" state
variable in the subsequent period. This economic state, which may be a capital stock, a
public good, or the likelihood of an insurrection, evolves according to a simple non-stochastic
transition function of the previous period’s state, private actions, and the policy decision. The
government policy such as a tax, a public expenditure, or public investment, is determined
1Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,V o l .1 ,c h . 4
2Among other things, these reforms delineated citizenship and allowed for participation in the citizen
Assembly. See Fine, (1983).
1each period by the median voter from a possibly restricted set of eligible voters. Each citizen’s
private decision may aﬀect others. For example, the decision may be labor eﬀort, or savings, or
voluntary contributions to a public good, or participation in a popular revolt. These decisions
spill over to others’ payoﬀs either directly by entering their preferences or indirectly through
changes in the state. Payoﬀsi nag i v e np e r i o dd e p e n do nt h e s ed e c i s i o n sa n do nt h ec u r r e n t
state.
A key characteristic of the model is that political rights are explicitly chosen to solve a
strategic delegation problem. Initially, the franchise is restricted – a subset of the citizens
has voting rights. The current median voter of the restricted group, however, may choose
to expand the set of citizens with voting rights. In this way, each period’s median voter can
eﬀectively delegate decision authority to a new median in the next period by changing the
set of eligible voters. Because the franchise option is a carefully calibrated instrument in the
hands of the currently enfranchised, universal suﬀrage need not result. A current median may
choose to extend the vote to only a subset of the remaining citizens.
Moreover, this strategic delegation is recursive. Since no commitment is attributed to
a current franchise extension, an extension of rights is not a once-and-for-all decision. A
franchise extension now does not preclude the future enfranchised group from extending even
further later on. Consequently, extension may be a slow, gradual process by which elites
extend to lessor elites, who proceed eventually to elites-in-waiting, and so forth.
With the eﬀective delegation of decision authority from one median voter to another, a
complete description of the state in each period is given by the economic state variable and the
identity of the current median voter (the "political state" variable). A Franchise Extension
equilibrium is a state-contingent proﬁle of private actions, and public policies and franchise
decisions that constitutes a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game in which, in each state,
the policy and franchise choice is determined by a median voter.
Franchise Extension equilibria are shown to exhibit partial, gradual, and possibly uneven
franchise extensions. The unevenness may be due to the particular evolution of the economic
state variable, or it may be due to peculiarities in the distribution of heterogeneous citizens.
We provide a characterization of franchise extension equilibrium in terms of its Euler equations,
each corresponding to a participant’s decision problem. These Euler equations are analogous
to those in dynamic politico-economic models of policy such as found in the "Generalized
Euler equation" approach of Klein, Krusell, and Ríos Rull (2002). However, Euler equations
in dynamic enfranchisement games contain strategic interaction terms not present in politico-
economic models.
In fact, these extra terms are the key to understanding franchise extension. Our main result
shows that an extension of the franchise occur in a given period if and only if the private
decisions of the citizenry have a net positive (marginal) spillover to the dynamic payoﬀ of the
current median voter. The size of the extension depends on the size of the spillover.
Among other things, the result implies that in the absence of private decisions of the
citizens, policies alone cannot cause a pivotal decision maker to relinquish power. Private
2decisions of the citizenry represent an implicit "policy-relevant" externality that the pivotal
decision maker does not control. Because of the dynamic nature of the problem, current
"policy-bribes" cannot induce the appropriate eﬀort from the public since they do not guar-
antee favorable policies in the future.
The franchise extension, however, does oﬀer a guarantee. A change in voting rights places
decision authority in the hands of a diﬀerent pivotal voter in the future. Hence, franchise
extensions represent a credible commitment to future policies that are closer to those preferred
by the disenfranchised citizens. If this elicits a positive spillover in their eﬀort choices, the
pivotal voter today is willing to sacriﬁce his power.
The idea that franchise is a commitment device was also explored in a seminal paper on the
franchise by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). They posit a model in which a ruling elite can
choose whether in any period to make a once-and-for-all, universal extension of voting rights
to the rest of the population. The motive is to pre-empt a threat of uprising or revolution. We
refer to this pre-emption motive as the "external conﬂict" explanation. The external conﬂict
explanation contrasts with an "internal conﬂict" explanation, an example of which is a recent
paper by Lizzeri and Persico (2003). According to "internal conﬂict" explanation, rights are
extended to build support in an ideological or class conﬂict within the elite.
Section 2 discusses similarities and diﬀerences between our approach and these and other
models of franchise extension. Section 3 describes the basic framework. We show by means
of several examples that dynamic enfranchisement games are broad enough to accommodate
both "internal" and "external conﬂict" explanations. The results therefore suggest ac o m m o n
causal mechanism that underlies both types of rationale. In Section 4 we characterize Franchise
Extension equilibria that admit a ﬁrst order characterization, i.e, that satisfy and are fully
characterized by interior Euler equations. The main results are described there. Section 5 ﬁnds
explicit analytical solutions in a number of distinct environments. These cases illustrate how
the model can produce franchise extension paths that are roughly consistent with observed
political reforms. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Section 7 is an Appendix with proofs
of the main results.
2 Three Observations and Two Types of Models
Many of the franchise extensions observed throughout history have common characteristics.
There are three qualitative characteristics of observed franchise extensions that the present
framework should confront.
(I) Most extensions are partial extensions. Historically, ruling elites have not had
to choose exclusively between dictatorship and universal suﬀrage. More often, voting rights
are oﬀered to the "adjacent" group in the social hierarchy. Often the restricted franchise was
deﬁned by wealth.3 Finer (1997, p. 336) writes of nascent democracy in the Greek city states:
3The term timocracy was introduced by Aristotle to characterize systems restricted in this way ( see
3"In the earliest forms of restricted participation, that is, in the oligarchies, a
property qualiﬁcation constituted the basis for full citizenship. Later, in some
cities, all sources of wealth were put on equality with land, and citizens’ rights and
duties were gradated according to one’s riches."
In the 19th century, England partially expanded along lines of wealth or property ownership
as well. However, in Italy, the franchise was granted to citizens who passed certain educational
as well as ﬁnancial criteria in 1849. 19th century Prussia presents an interesting case: in 1849,
voting rights were extended to most citizens, but these rights were accorded proportionately
to the percentage of taxes paid.4 Finally, even today in most countries the franchise is usually
restricted in some way.5
(II) Extensions are typically gradual processes, not one shot decisions. England’s
history bears this out. A brief chronology of 19th and early 20th century franchise extensions
in the U.K. indicates a gradual broadening of political rights.6
1830 Voting franchise restricted to some 2% of population
1832 Reform Act extends franchise to 3.5% of population
1867 Second Reform Act extends to some 7.7% of population
1884 Extension to 15% of population
1918 Universal male (over 21) suﬀrage and female (over 30) suﬀrage
1928 Universal suﬀrage (over 21)
Franchise extension in England had, in fact, a longer history whose beginnings predated
these extensions. In a number of other European countries, gradual extensions corresponded
to technological innovations such as those of the industrial revolution. In ancient Rome,
extensions occurred as the state’s boundaries gradually expanded.
(III) Extensions are often uneven. In many countries, large delays, lasting decades
or longer have occurred between successive extensions. Again, England’s chronology is an
example. Rights were extended in ﬁts and starts. In the Netherlands, voting rights were
extended in 1857 from 2% to 14% of the population. The next major expansion occurred in
1894 when rights were extended to all males. In Italy, universal male suﬀrage in 1912 was
preceded by an extension in 1882 (14%) which, in turn, was preceded by the partial extension
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html ).
4The electorate was divided into three groups, each group given equal weight in the voting. The wealthiest
individuals who accounted for the ﬁrst third of taxes paid accounted for 3.5% of the population. The next
wealthiest group – the "middle class" – accounted for 10-12% of the population. The rest of the population
(about 85%) accounted for the remaining third of the voting power.
5In the U.S., convicted felons cannot typically vote, and, until recently, "on-site" registration in some states
eﬀectively limits voting rights of the immobile and the mentally ill.
6Finer (1997), p. 1638.
4in 1849. In the ancient Roman Republic, various extensions not associated with territorial
expansion occurred in 494 BC, 336 BC, and 287 BC.7
Very little is known about whether and what types of models can accommodate these
criteria. There is a sizable informal literature in political science. For this we refer the reader
to the useful surveys in Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2003).
We concentrate instead on the much sparser formal modeling that has been done, starting
with Acemoglu and Robinson’s work (2000, 2001), itself.8 The essential claim in Acemoglu
and Robinson’s work is that the primary force behind, at least, the 19th century extensions
was the desire by the elite to head oﬀ social unrest. AR postulate a dynamic game in which
the timing of an all-or-nothing franchise extension is determined by the median voter of a
ruling elite. A state variable evolves stochastically which determines the rate of success of
any popular revolt. In the absence of a franchise decision, the disenfranchised mob, acting as
a unitary actor, revolts in certain states of the world, and refrains in others. Redistribution
to the disenfranchised is not a credible deterrent since it will only be used in threatening
states of the world. By contrast, an extension of voting rights to the entire population puts
the decision in the hands of the population median who chooses redistribution in all states.
Extensions are then a credible way to buy-oﬀ the populace. Hence, franchise extensions pre-
empt revolutions.
A somewhat similar motive for extending the franchise appears in a model by Conley and
Temimi (2001). They examine a game in which extension of voting rights occurs because of
the potential for the disenfranchised group to impose costs on the elite through rioting and
protest if the franchise is not extended. These costs induce a trade-oﬀ not unlike that in the
dynamic counterpart by AR. Expansion entails a loss of decision making power. However, it
also pre-empts the costly social unrest. Unlike AR, the CT model cannot address dynamic
issues such as timing of the franchise decision. However, unlike AR, they do address the
explicit free rider problems in the decision to revolt.
These "external conﬂict" models may be contrasted with an alternative "internal conﬂict"
story in which political competition within the elite leads one or another faction to reach
out to disenfranchised citizens. Lizzeri and Persico (2003) formulate a game with elements
of this story. They examine a static, random voter model of spatial competition between
two candidates who vie for votes among a restricted franchise. The competition creates an
ineﬃciency when there are relatively few eligible voters. A franchise extension is shown to
lead to a more eﬃcient electoral process in terms of the allocation of expenditure between
public goods and private transfers.
In a similar vein, Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) examine a ﬁnite horizon dynamic
7In 336 BC, one of the consulships became available for election by plebians. In 287 BC the Hortensian
Law was introduced which gave resolutions in the plebian council the force of law. Again, see Finer (1997).
8We limit our attention to models in which franchise decisions are explicitly endogenous. In particular, we
acknowledge but do not discuss a large literature that examines the consequences of the expansion of rights.
To name one example, Husted and Kenny (1997) examine the eﬀect of extensions on the size of government
expenditures.
5game in which any member of a society can unilaterally invite a desirable outsider to join
the society from abroad. Though theirs is essentially a model of immigration rather than of
franchise extension (since outsiders are not members of society before they enter), it shares
the feature that internal frictions are the driving force inﬂuencing "who gets in."
In the subsequent section, we describe a class of dynamic enfranchisement games that
can accommodate many of the key elements of these diverse models. In contrast to existing
models that focus on one source of conﬂict (external threat) or another (internal political
competition), our model allows conﬂicting objectives across all members of society. We also
require a rich enough class of environments that can produce dynamic paths of extensions
consistent with the aforementioned facts regarding the evolution of the franchise.
3 Dynamic Enfranchisement Games
In this section we ﬁrst describe a class of abstract, dynamic games that admit the possibility of
franchise extension. We then provide several examples subsumed by the general framework.
3.1 Abstract formulation
There are n citizens in a society, each labeled i =1 ,...,n. Citizens are assumed to diﬀer
according to a taste, productivity, or income parameter. These diﬀerences induce a natural
ordering of citizens which, in turn, coincides with the ordering deﬁned by the index i.9 The
population of all citizens is denoted N.
Time is discrete: t =0 ,1,2,....A t t i m e t, each individual chooses some action eit that
describes a private decision taken by citizen i at date t.W el e tE denote the set of feasible
private decisions for each citizen, and denote the vector of eﬀorts by
et =( e1t,...,e nt ).
These decisions may capture any number of activities, including labor eﬀort, savings, or invest-
ment activities. They may also include "non-economic" activities such as religious worship.
To simplify language, we refer to the decision as simply the eﬀort choice.
Also at time t, a policy variable pt, chosen from some feasible set P. For example, p may
be a ﬂat tax rate on income which generates revenue to produce a public good. We assume
that policies, whatever they happen to be, are outcomes of a political process. This political
process aggregates the preferences of a subset of the population Mt ⊆ N. That is, political
rights are restricted to the citizens in Mt. If, for example, Mt is a single individual, then this
9For example, if citizens diﬀer in exogenous wealth y, then we shall assume yi <y j whenever i>j .
6individual is a dictator with respect to policy choices.10
The natural interpretation here is that political rights are voting rights,a n ds o ,t oﬁx
ideas, a median voter aggregation is assumed here. The model could subsume a number of
other political aggregation processes without fundamental changes in the analysis. Let i = mt
denote the median voter of the restricted franchise in period t. The population is ordered so
that the enfranchised citizenry is described by the set, Mt = {1,2,...,2mt − 1}.
By their vote, certain citizens have the right to choose current policies. However, they can
also choose to extend these rights to others in the future. This may be done for a number of
reasons, some of which were outlined in the Introduction. Each period, therefore, the currently
enfranchised group chooses, along with the policy pt, a group next period that will have the
same rights and choices in period t +1 . Speciﬁcally, citizens in Mt choose, via the median
voter, to enfranchise a group Mt+1 next period.
Because policies and franchise choices are determined by the median voter (the so-called
"Condorcet Winner"), we can equivalently think of the median voter in period t,d e n o t e db y
i = mt, as choosing the median voter in the following period, that is mt+1.11 At the beginning
of the game, the median voter is denoted by m0.
At each date t,e ﬀort and policy choices interact to inﬂuence a physical state variable
denoted by ωt ∈ Ω. In most of the analysis the state is one-dimensional, i.e., Ω ⊂ R.T h i s
state may represent a level of capital stock or a stock of natural resource. Alternatively, it
could represent aggregate wealth or another moment of the distribution of income, or the
strength of an overthrow threat. This physical state ωt is assumed to evolve according to a
transition function Q where
ωt+1 = Q(ωt,e t,p t)
and ω0 is given exogenously in order to begin the process. A complete description of the
state of the game at date t is given, then, by (ωt,m t).




t ui(ωt,e t,p t )
where δ is a common discount factor, and the stage payoﬀ is ui. Note that since a citizen’s
private decision can aﬀect others, his decision may be subject to a "free rider" problem in the
sense that under (or over) provision of ei, relative to some socially optimum benchmark, is
likely.
10We not model how these rights are enforced or preserved. Of course, the state variable could capture some
the technology for of preserving these restricted rights.
11In principle, if franchise contraction is permitted, any individual in the population can be made the
median voter by suitable choice of Mt+1. However, we restrict the analysis to (weak) franchise extensions.
For example, if the initial enfranchised group is of the form M0 = {1,2,...,n0}, then this restriction means
that the median voter can never have an index m<n 0/2.




This speciﬁcation has made two key simplifying modeling assumptions. First, we assume
that all decisions are one dimensional. This is clearly made for reasons of tractability. Second,
we have assumed that the dynamic game is deterministic. This could easily be modiﬁed to
allows for shocks and other stochastic features. In general, one would ordinarily use the lan-
guage of stochastic games (where Q evolves according to a Markov kernel). The deterministic
assumption is made, not so much for tractability, but for ease of illustration. The basic ideas
are expressed most directly in the deterministic case.
We examine dynamic enfranchisement games that satisfy the following assumptions.
(A1) Ω ⊂ IR and both E and P are compact, convex intervals in IR +.
(A2) For each i, ui and Q are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly, jointly concave in
all variables.
3.2 Examples
In this Section, we show that the class of Dynamic Enfranchisement Games is broad enough to
cover a large number of interesting political/policy examples including environments in which
internal or external conﬂicts exist.
3.2.1 Conﬂict over Wealth Accumulation
A classic dynamic policy game problem involves wealth accumulation with public capital.
Citizens in the population exert costly labor eﬀort ei in a given period which generates income
in the following period. We denote the income earned by individual i in the current period
t by ωit, and the current economic state is aggregate income ωt =
P
iωit.T h e p o l i c y pt
is a proportional tax on income, revenue from which, ptωt, is used to maintain productive
infrastructure for next period. That is, the level of infrastructure available for use is therefore
the tax revenue generated in the previous period. There is no private saving. An individual’s
income generation depends on his labor and the level of public investment Hence, ωit +1 =
fi(ptωt,e it) where f is a concave, increasing production function. The physical state therefore
evolves according to the transition function




8In a given period, individual i cares about after-tax income (i.e., consumption) and about
leisure according to a utility function
ui(ωt,e t,p t)=u((1 − pt)ωit,e it)
for a utility u which is increasing in after tax income and decreasing in labor eﬀort.
Here, citizens diﬀer according to initial income, ωi 0. Clearly, to the extent that initial
income diﬀerences create or preserve continued income diﬀerences, diﬀerent preferred tax
rates are induced even if all citizens have the same utility function, u, since their realized
utility each period, u((1 − pt)ωit,e it),d i ﬀers by income, ωit in period t. The voter with the
median income in the enfranchised group may wish to induce additional eﬀort from certain
citizens in the population by committing to a diﬀerent tax rate than he, the median voter
would choose by himself. One way to do this would be to grant authority for future tax policy
t oad i ﬀerent median voter.
3.2.2 Internal Conﬂicts over Public Goods
This example captures elements of the "internal conﬂict" explanation of franchise extension.12
Tax revenue is again used to invest in an asset, but now it yields a public consumption
good. Each citizen holds wealth in the form of land. The land endowment, yi, of citizen i
is exogenous, and it does not vary over time. Aggregate income is Y =
P
i yi. The policy
pt in period t is a ﬂat tax on land, yielding revenue ptY . Aggregate individual eﬀort,
P
i eit,
instead of augmenting personal incomes, increase the value of the public good next period.





where ωt+1 is the public good produced next period. Finally, citizen i cares about after-tax
wealth, about leisure, and about the public good. His payoﬀ in period t is
ui(ωt,e t,p t)=u(yi(1 − pt),e it,α iωt)
Here, citizens in the population could diﬀer in at least two ways. First, they could diﬀer
according to a taste parameter αi ∈ [0,1]. Citizens with higher values of α may place higher
value of on public good. Examples of this type of conﬂict include views on of state-supported
religion, or the support of certain social policies, such as opposition to scientiﬁct h e o r i e so f
evolution, the promotion of liberal attitudes towards race and sexual preference issues, and
the enactment and enforcement of anti-abortion laws. One would expect in this case that
12However, the speciﬁcs here are very diﬀerent from the "internal conﬂict" explanation in Lizzeri and Persico
(LP) (2003). We discuss the diﬀerences between LP and the present work at some length in Section 5.3.
9preferred tax rates will diﬀer across the population. We refer to cases of taste heterogeneity
such as this as cases of ideological conﬂict.
Second, citizens may diﬀe ri nt h ea m o u n to fl a n dw e a l t h ,yi, they have. We refer to cases of
income or wealth heterogeneity as cases of class conﬂict.C l a s sc o n ﬂict of this type is common
in public economics, and can be shown to induce diﬀerences in voting behavior regarding
redistribution, public goods, and tax policies generally.
3.2.3 The Threat of Insurrection
According to the "external conﬂict" explanation, franchise expansion occurs to head oﬀ the
threat of revolution, uprising, or insurrection. Implicitly, such threats arise from the non-
satisfaction of the preferences of the disenfranchised by the policies chosen by the elite,13 and
franchise extension may be an eﬀective means of reducing the incentives of agents to engage
in uprising.
In this example, a class conﬂict coupled with the threat of insurrection is the driving
force behind a franchise extension. In some sense, this example is close to Acemoglu’s and
Robinson’s model of "threat of revolt" as an explanation for the 19th century extensions.
To simplify things there are two distinct groups, referred to concretely as the nobility
(Group A) and the peasantry (Group B), respectively. There are J such peasants, and n− J
noblemen. The franchise belongs to a subset of the nobility. A nobleman with index i has
aq u a n t i t yo fl a n dyi where, as before, yi is constant across time. Each period, a unit of
land generates a unit of a consumption good, so that yi acres generate yi units of potential
consumption. By contrast, peasants are completely disenfranchised and possess no land.
Each period t, there is a possibility that the peasants may successfully revolt and conﬁscate
the nobility’s aggregate return, Y ≡
P
i∈A yi from land. Each peasant j =1 ,...,J, contributes
ejt toward this eﬀort, while each nobleman i = J +1 ,...,n contributes eﬀort eit toward
suppressing the revolt. As before, eﬀort is costly to all citizens.
Let EAt =
P
i∈A eit and EBt =
P
j∈B ejt denote the aggregate eﬀort by nobility and
peasantry, respectively, in period t. The state variable, ωt, is the probability in period t that
the conﬁscation by the peasants is unsuccessful. Formally,
ωt+1 = f(EAt,E Bt,ω t)
so that the success likelihood depends on the aggregate eﬀort of each group, presumably
increasing in EAt (less likely conﬁscation) and decreasing in EBt (more likely conﬁscation).
13One motivation for rebellion that we do not consider is the simple desire to be part of the decision-
making process, independent of whether existing decisions are in accordance with a disenfranchised individual’s
preferences. That is, there is no explicit utility gained from "having the vote".
10If a conﬁscation is successful, then the entire return Y is expropriated by the peasantry
who split it evenly. On the other hand, if the revolt is unsuccessful, then peasants receive a
redistributive subsidy chosen by the median voter in the restricted franchise before the state
revolt’s success is known. Roughly, the idea is that redistribution is used to "buy oﬀ"t h e
peasants by inducing them to reduce their eﬀort toward the uprising.14
Each period t, the median nobleman chooses a redistributive tax rate pt which produces
revenue ptY . However, the technology for redistribution is concave – implying that some of
the revenue is potentially lost in the redistributive process. Formally, revenue ptY produces
g(ptY ) available to be equally distributed to all members of society if there is no conﬁscation,
where g is a concave function.
All citizens have von Neumann Morganstern utility u deﬁned on consumption and eﬀort.
Members of the nobility have expected utility in period t of
uit = ωt u((1 − pt)yi + g(ptY )/n, eit )+ ( 1 − ωt)u(0,e it)
while members of the peasantry have utility
ujt = ωt u(g(ptY )/n, ejt)+( 1 − ωt) u(Y/J, ejt)
To summarize, individuals in the nobility diﬀer by income, and the policy instrument is
a redistributive tax. Individuals can either be supportive of the current policy or they can
undermine it. Their current eﬀorts determine the likelihood that the currently enfranchised
group remains in power.
3.3 Franchise Extension Equilibria
Fix a dynamic enfranchisement game G. We assume that all citizens condition their behavior
only on payoﬀ relevant information. The payoﬀ relevant state is a pair (ω,m).H e r e , ω is
interpreted as the "economic" state while m represents the "political" state. Strategies that
condition only on the state are commonly referred to as Markov strategies. A Markov strategy
proﬁle is a triple Π ≡ (σ,ψ,µ) where
σ =( σ1,...,σn)
and σi : Ω × N → E for each i.H e r e ,σi(ωt,m t)=eit is the action taken by citizen i when
the physical state is ωt and the current median voter is mt in period t.
Analogously, ψ : Ω × N → P where ψ(ωt,m t)=pt is the policy chosen by the current
median voter mt when the physical state is ωt in period t.
14Hence, the example has features (deliberately) similar to the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
11Finally, µ : Ω × N → N where µ(ωt,m t)=mt+1 is next period’s pivotal voter chosen by
the current median voter mt when the physical state is ωt. Recall our earlier remark on the
relation between median mt and the enfranchised group, Mt. While the franchise decision
should logically correspond to a set Mt+1 of citizens who are given the right to vote next
period, there is no loss of generality in presuming that the current median voter mt selects
next period’s median voter mt+1 directly as long as a Median Voter Theorem holds.
To summarize, σ is a proﬁle of individual behavioral rules of the citizenry; ψ is the policy
rule; µ is the franchise rule. The last two are determined by the median voter in each period.
The payoﬀs to each individual i of a Markov strategy proﬁle, Π =( σ,ψ,µ) in state (ωt,m t)
can be expressed recursively as
Vi(ωt,m t; Π ) ≡ ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),ψ(ωt,m t))+δV i(ωt+1,m t+1; Π ) (1)
where
ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),ψ(ωt,m t)) (2)
and
mt+1 = µ(ωt,m t) (3)
The following Lemma identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition, familiar in static models, to imply
the existence of a median voter in the dynamic model.
Lemma (Median Voter Theorem) Fix some proﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ). For any state (ωt,m t)
in period t, and for any pair of policy and voting franchise choices (pt,m t+1) and (ˆ pt, ˆ mt+1) in
which ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),p t) and ˆ ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ(ωt,m t), ˆ pt),r e s p . ,s u p p o s ef o rs o m ei
[ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),p t)+δV i(ωt+1,m t+1; Π )] − [ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t), ˆ pt)+δV i(ˆ ωt+1, ˆ mt+1; Π )] > 0.
(4)
Suppose that (4) holds for citizen i implies that (4) holds for every citizen, j>i .T h e n ,i n
each such state, (ωt,m t), there exists a policy choice and franchise decision, (p∗
t,m ∗
t+1),s u c h
that no other pairing of policy choice and franchise decision is strictly preferred to (p∗
t,m ∗
t+1)
by a strict majority of the voters in Mt.
The Lemma is an immediate consequence of a well known result by Gans and Smart
(1996), in which a single crossing property on voter preferences, namely (4) holds for i implies
(4) holds for all j>i , implies a Condorcet Winner exists and coincides with the individual
with the median index, m. Because this ordering of citizens does not vary across states, the
hypothesis of the Lemma is actually stronger than necessary if the goal is merely to produce
a median voter in each state. In the absence of a change in the franchise, the same median
voter will prevail each period. Though strong, this assumption will prove useful for isolating
12the eﬀect of a change in the franchise due to a deliberate decision rather than due to an
environmental change.
Deﬁnition A Franchise Extension equilibrium (FEE) is a Markov proﬁle, Π =( σ,ψ,µ),
consisting of state contingent eﬀorts, policies, and enfranchisement choices such that at each
date t =0 ,1,2,..., the following hold.
(i) Optimal eﬀort decisions For any state (ωt,m t),e a c hi,a n de a c hˆ σi,
Vi(ωt,m t; Π ) ≥ Vi(ωt,m t;ˆ σi,σ−i,ψ,µ)
(ii) Single Crossing Property ensuring a Median Voter The hypothesis of the Median Voter
Lemma applies.
(iii) Optimal policy and franchise decisions For any state (ωt,m t) and for any ˆ emt, ˆ pt,a n d
ˆ mt+1,
Vmt(ωt,m t; Π ) ≥ umt(ωt,σ −mt(ωt,m t),ˆ emt, ˆ pt)+δV mt(ˆ ωt+1, ˆ mt+1; Π )
where ˆ ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ−mt(ωt,m t),ˆ emt, ˆ p).
(iv) (Consistency of Voting Franchise Rule) For any state (ωt,m t), there exists a ﬁnite set
M = {1,2,...,n 0} ⊂ N for which µ(ωt,m t) is the median voter in M.
A Franchise Extension equilibrium (FEE) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium with a well
deﬁned Condorcet Winner that makes policy and franchise decisions. Each citizen chooses
his own eﬀort optimally given the state and his (correct) forecast of others’ eﬀort rules and
the policy/franchise rules. Median or pivotal voters exist in each state, and the pivotal voter
chooses policy, eﬀort, and the future franchise optimally given the state and his (correct)
forecast of the eﬀort rules of the rest of the citizenry. Property (iv) requires that the delegation
decision is equivalent to some alteration of the current franchise under a median voter. The
question of general existence of FEE is taken up in a companion paper (Lagunoﬀ (2003) ). In
the present paper, we construct FEE equilibria in a number of parametric examples in Section
5.
It is worth noting that a delegated choice of mt+1 >m t made by the current median, mt,
need not correspond to a larger set of voters. However, to keep things simple, the sets Mt
will always be assumed to have the form {1,...,n 0}, and so a choice of mt+1 >m t will aways
correspond to an expansion of voting rights, i.e., Mt+1 ⊃ Mt.
133.4 Finite Agents versus the Continuum
We make two further modeling assumptions which deserve comment. First, it will prove more
tractable to relax the last Property (iv) of the equilibrium and treat the voter type as chosen
from a continuum rather than from a discrete set M.S p e c i ﬁcally, let N ⊂ [0,1].I f t h e
ﬁn i t es e to fv o t e r si ss u ﬃciently dense in the continuum, then the resulting franchise choices
constitute an approximation of the actual equilibrium.
An alternative modeling strategy might have posited a continuum of voters from the be-
ginning. However, the continuum presents a problem. In much of the history of voter enfran-
chisement, the eﬀort choices of citizens correspond to voluntary decisions in a collective action
problem such as volunteering to take part in a protest or public insurrection. But with the
continuum, free rider problems in these decisions are extreme. An individual in a continuum
would never choose to riot or threaten the status quo, or alternatively, to defend the status
quo. The ﬁnite agent assumption is therefore critical to prevent the unreasonable boundary
solution ei =0in eﬀort choices of citizens. Indeed, we later show that for franchise extension
to exist, these boundary solutions must not occur. To sum up, franchise choices are character-
ized in the next sections as if the current median could choose the subsequent median from a
continuum of types, but in the citizens’ private decisions, the ﬁnite agent assumption is taken
literally.
Second, though we treat the indices m as choice variables for voters, the Markov strategies
are actually functions of the types of players, rather than their identities. For example, in the
class conﬂict examples, individuals are ordered by wealth, y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ···≥ yn.I nt h a tc a s e ,
the strategy σi(ω,m) is just notational shorthand for σi(ω,ym). 15
4 First Order Characterization
In this Section we characterize necessary conditions for an FEE assuming diﬀerentiability of
the value function. Later we establish conditions under which diﬀerentiability holds. In all
that follows, we drop the time notation, t, and adopt the usual convention in which primes,
e.g., ω0, are used to denote variables in the subsequent period t +1 , and double primes, e.g.,
ω00, used to denote the variable two periods ahead t +2 .
Let Π =( σ,ψ,µ) be a Franchise Extension equilibrium (FEE). Consider, ﬁrst, a citizen’s
eﬀort decision. One can write the recursive payoﬀ evaluated at a FEE as the functional
15Of course, it must be assumed that citizens are suﬃciently dense in the type space to justify the assumption
that wealth is a continuous variable. Also, if types are not uniformly distributed, then there will be diﬀerences
between the type contingent strategy, σi(ω,ym), and the strategy σi(ω,m) that merely keeps track of player
index. In order to examine these explicit distributional considerations, we will use the "type" notation explicitly
when parametric examples are examined.
14equation:
Vi(ω,m; Π )=m a x
ei
[ui(ω,ei,σ−i(ω,m),ψ(ω,m)) + δV i(ω
0,µ(ω,m); Π )] (5)
subject to ω0 = Q(ω,ei,σ−i(ω,m),ψ(ω,m)) . If this value function is diﬀerentiable, then the









As for the pivotal voter’s problem, recall that the pivotal voter makes two choices. He
chooses a policy in the current period given the state ω. He also chooses next period’s median
voter by making a franchise decision in the current period. That is, a median voter with index
m chooses next period’s median, m0. The functional equation resulting from the dual choice
of policy and franchise is




subject to ω0 = Q(ω,em,σ−m(ω,m),p). Derived from this value function, the interior Euler













Deﬁnition We will say that a Franchise Extension equilibrium, Π =( σ,ψ,µ),a d m i t s a
ﬁrst order characterization if for each citizen i a n de a c hv o t e rm,i ne v e r ys t a t e(ω,m),( i )
the proﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ) satisﬁes the Equations (6), (7), and (8) , (ii) the expression in (6) is
strictly decreasing in ei, and (iii) if the matrix of second derivatives of the system formed
by (the left-hand sides of) (6), (7), and (8) is negative semi-deﬁnite.
Any FEE that admits a ﬁrst order characterization is fully characterized by its Euler equa-
tions. Among them, Equation (8), is the most relevant for understanding franchise expansion.
15Expressed in terms of a useful decomposition of marginal eﬀects, Equation (8) is given by,
∂Vm
∂m0 =
eﬀect of m0 on future policy



































Clearly, a voter m chooses to expand the current franchise only if (9) is satisﬁed at values
µ(ω,m) >m . The decomposition illustrates the various marginal eﬀects that a change in
the future pivotal voter has on the payoﬀ of the current pivotal voter. This means that the
current pivotal voter, m, rationally anticipates his choice of m0 on future eﬀort choices of the
citizenry, and future policies and franchise decisions of subsequent median voters (including
himself, should he choose to retain political power). Among other things, the current median
realizes that his choice of franchise expansion may not be the end of the process. Since next
period’s pivotal voter, m0, also satisﬁes his Euler equations, (7) and (8), if the current pivotal
over, m, extends the franchise to m0 >m , then the Single Crossing Property implies
eﬀect of m0 on future policy















∂m0 ≤ 0 (10)
A franchise extension, therefore, implies that the marginal payoﬀ from other citizens’ eﬀort
responses to the extension be nonnegative, i.e.,















∂m0 ≥ 0 (11)
Hence, an optimal enfranchisement for voter m balances the positive marginal eﬀect from
future eﬀort choices (11) from the citizenry with the negative marginal eﬀect of putting future
policy and franchise decisions in the hand of other agents (10). This is illustrated by the two
solid lines in Figure 1. If the current median voter is m, retaining the franchise results in no
loss of control - that is, a zero marginal cost. On the other hand, extending the franchise

















Figure 1: Optimal enfranchisement equates marginal beneﬁts from preferable eﬀort decisions
with marginal costs of future policy and franchise distortions
large costs in terms of future policy and franchise decisions. The index m0 balances these two
eﬀects.
In fact, the logic can be extended to obtain the following necessary and suﬃcient condition
for franchise extension.
Proposition 1 In any Franchise Extension equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characteri-



















∂m0 > 0 (12)
holds at m = m0.
Though the result is a straightforward application of the Envelope Theorem, we include
the complete proof in the Appendix. Roughly, the idea is that franchise extension requires
the spillover of eﬀort choices of ordinary citizens, without which a current policy maker would
preserve his own power to make future policy decisions into perpetuity. This is true regardless
of whether the eﬀort choices are directed toward investment in public goods or the investment
in political upheaval.
17This last point is worth emphasizing. Speciﬁcally, the same causal mechanism underlies
both the so-called “internal conﬂict" and “external conﬂict" explanations for franchise exten-
sion.I nt h ei n t e r n a lc o n ﬂict story, disagreements within the elite over public goods create a
motive by some to extend voting rights to “sympathetic outsiders." The eﬀort choice is, for
instance, a private input needed to produce the controversial good. In the external conﬂict
story, the threat of uprising or insurrection creates a “buy oﬀ" motive for expansion of rights.
The eﬀort choice, in that case, is one’s contribution either to the cause of overturning or to the
cause of defending the current regime. In either case, the franchise is extended if and only if
the aggregate eﬀect of these spillovers are positive. Presumably, the larger the spillover eﬀect,
the larger is the extension.
In the presence of spillovers, a franchise extension can accomplish what a policy change
cannot. Namely, the franchise extension is a credible commitment to future policy changes.
The pivotal voter cannot credibly use current policy instruments to change future behavior
except through (blunt) changes in the physical state. Since current policy changes do not imply
future policy changes, citizens with preferences that diﬀer widely from those of the pivotal
voter expect the same median voter to continue to produce poor policy choices (“poor" from
their point of view) in the future.
By contrast, an extension delegates authority to a diﬀerent pivotal voter tomorrow. This
guarantees that future policies in subsequent periods are closer to those that the current
median voter would like to be able to commit to. Since this elicits a positive spillover in their
eﬀort choices, the pivotal voter today is willing to sacriﬁce his power. In this sense, the role
of franchise extension is a familiar one in time-consistent models of policy. Extensions are
credible since they delegate policy-making authority to a median whose tastes are closer to
the large group of citizens.
Notice, however, that while the enfranchisement option may improve things, it is not gen-
erally a perfect substitute for the optimal, time inconsistent policy sequence. With recursive
enfranchisement, the initial voter cannot limit future franchise extensions. A future median
may delegate beyond the point at which the ﬁrst median would choose if the ﬁrst median
could make a once-and-for-all franchise decision. In turn, this possibility distorts the current
decision. To see this, consider an optimal once-and-for-all extension. A once-and-for-all ex-
tension trades oﬀ the marginal beneﬁts of extra eﬀort against the marginal costs of future
policy changes (the dashed curve) as illustrated in Figure 1. Since these costs do not include
the costs of future extensions, the new median is m0 >m 0.S i n c e m0 < ¯ m0 in Figure 1, the
current median limits the extension of the franchise below that of a once-and-for-all decision.
An immediate corollary of the Proposition is: absent the spillovers in private decisions,
the level of voter enfranchisement remains ﬁxed. This statement has predictive content. Con-
sider an example of a policy that subsidizes a particular "state religion." Current subsidies
determine, say, the subsequent available stock of churches. Citizen i’s church attendance does
not aﬀect others’ payoﬀs, and it does not aﬀect the technology for building churches. In this
case, the current median voter will not delegate authority to another. Though conﬂicts over
18state-funded religion may, in fact, create serious social conﬂict, it would not then lead to
broader political rights.
Proposition 1 provides a relatively simple way to check if an expansion of the franchise
occurs in equilibrium. To make full use of it, however, requires practical use of all the Euler
equations, since the Inequality (12) depends on knowing both values of the equilibrium strate-
gies, and their curvature. Consequently, the Euler equations (6)-(8) require a reformulation
that depends, to the extent possible, only on the "primitives" of the problem.
Proposition 2 Let Π =( σ,ψ,µ) denote a proﬁle of continuously diﬀerentiable Markov strate-
gies such that in every state (ω,m),t h ev a l u e sσ(ω,m), ψ(ω,m),a n dµ(ω,m) lie in the interior
of their respective strategy sets. Then Π is a Franchise Extension equilibrium that admits a
ﬁrst order characterization if and only if it satisﬁes the following.
I. In every state (ω,m),t h ep r o ﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ) satisﬁes:















































































































=0 , ∀i ∈ N (E-3)
II. The expression G3
i for each i is strictly decreasing in ei.
19III. The matrix of second derivatives of the system formed by (G1
m,G 2
m,G 3
m) is negative semi-
deﬁnite.
IV. For all i ,if G1
idp + G2
idm0 > 0 ,t h e nG1
jdp + G2
jdm0 > 0 for all j>i
The Euler equations (E-1), (E-2), and (E-3) are reformulated from the original Euler
equations (7), (8), and (6), respectively, in order to eliminate their functional dependence on
the value functions. What remains is a collection of n partial diﬀerential equations in the
strategy proﬁle Π. Klein, Krusell, and Ríos Rull (KKR) (2002) examine properties of similar
"Envelope-adjusted" Euler equations in recursively competitive equilibrium models of policy.
They refer to these equations as Generalized Euler Equations. As in their reformulation, the
Euler equations above diﬀer substantially from those of single agent, dynamic programming
problems. Unlike in dynamic programming problems, these Euler equations depend on one’s
equilibrium decision rules in the future, and on others’ equilibrium decision rules in the present
and in the future. Hence, they cannot be reduced to pure expressions of primitives as is typical
of Euler equations in DP problems.16 Despite their apparent complexity, the primary virtue of
Properties I-IV is that they provide a computationally tractable characterization of Franchise
Extension equilibria. We make further use of these properties in examples below.
5 Parametric Environments
Here we examine a series of parametric cases. These cases illustrate how the ﬁrst order char-
acterization may be used to understand enfranchisement. They also illustrate how enfran-
chisement may exhibit many of the qualitative features outlined in Section 2. The equilibria
in each of these environments are stationary in the economic state, ω. This means ∂ψ/∂ω =0




















16Moreover, the politico-economic and policy modelsu s e db yK K Ra n do t h e r si nt h el i t e r a t u r ea r en o t ,
strictly speaking, dynamic games since individual behavior is ﬁltered out in those models by the competitive
price mechanism. Even without a franchise decision, the Euler equations in the present paper contain a number
of extra terms not found in the competitive, "hybrid" models. See Lagunoﬀ (2003) for an extended discussion
of dynamic political games. A related, though simpler (no policy or franchise decisions), version of the Euler
equations in (I) also shows up in Basar and Olsder (1995, Theorem 6.5).
205.1 Conﬂict without Franchise Extension
As the results show, extensions are not useful unless they change future behavior. To illustrate
this idea, we revisit the example with ideological conﬂict in wealth accumulation – Section
3.2.1. Recall that an individual’s income, ω0
i, next period is generated by one’s own labor eﬀort,







Individuals diﬀer by the relative weights they attach to labor and the consumption:
u(ω,e,p;αi)=( 1 − αi)log(ωi(1 − p)) + αilog(1 − ei).
These weights are ordered from lowest to highest so that α1 ≥ ··· ≥ αn.B y a s s o c i a t i n g
the indices of citizens to the ordering of marginal utility types, we will verify that the single
crossing property holds. If αm0 is smaller than the population median weight, then the initial
franchise is restricted. An extension of the franchise therefore represents a delegation of
decision authority to citizens with higher marginal utility of leisure than that of the initial
median voter. Notationally, we can express all decision rules as functions of type αm.
The basic intuition of the model is that by commiting to a diﬀerent future policy, current
(and future) eﬀort choices can be inﬂuenced in a way that is beneﬁcial to the current median
voter. In the current example, next period’s tax rate determines how much of next period’s
income is available for consumption, which in turn determines the net productivity of today’s
eﬀort, so there is a potential link between p0 and ei for individual i. However, if we write out
the relevant parts of i’s dynamic payoﬀ,w eﬁnd








= αi log(1 − ei)+δ(1 − αi)log([(pω)
θe
1−θ
i ](1 − p
0)) + ...
which is additively separable in ei and p0.17 We therefore expect that individual i’s eﬀort
choice will be independent of his (correct) prediction of future tax rates, so there is no beneﬁt
to the current median in trying to induce a change in behavior by extending the franchise.
Indeed, even if the current median could commit to a diﬀerent tax policy, it would not do so.
We conﬁrm this intuition, by ﬁrst verifying that this game has a Franchise Extension
equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characterization. The equilibrium is invariant in the
economic state, ω. In this environment, Equation (13), which characterizes the ω-stationary
Euler equation for private eﬀort, becomes
17The 00 terms and beyond include ei and p0 due to the evolution of the physical state, but since the transition





























Using the fact that ω0
i =( pω)θe
1−θ
i and ω0 =( pω)θ P
j e
1−θ
j and using the consistency
condition e0















Solving for ei gives the stationary FEE behavioral rule,
σi(ω,αm)=ei =
δ(1 − αi)
αi(1 − δ θ
1−θ)+δ(1 − αi)
. (14)
Notice that the behavior in equilibrium is invariant to current policy as well as being invariant





so that tax rates are also state-invariant. In particular, they do not vary with the index of
the median voter. Evidently, the separability implied by logarithmic preferences means that
even with the inter-temporal link between tax revenue and the productivity of eﬀort, current
eﬀort levels are independent of current tax rates.
Now observe that by Proposition 1, a necessary condition for franchise extension is that
∂σj
∂m > 0, or, as a direct function of type,
∂σj
∂αm < 0 for some j 6= m. However, as is indicated by
(14),
∂σj
∂αm =0unless j = m. Hence, this example does not admit a franchise extension. The
current type, αm0 retains decision authority forever. This is not surprising given the nature
of the policy and eﬀort rules.
5.2 Internal Class Conﬂict Generates Franchise Extension
Recall the examples in Section 3.2.2 where the environment exhibits a class conﬂict over a
public good. yi is each individual’s exogenous land endowment. The aggregate endowment is
Y =
P
iy.Aﬂat tax rate p on land is chosen by the median enfranchised voter, and it ﬁnances
a public good, ω. Citizens diﬀer in their endowments. Speciﬁcally, the citizens are ordered so
that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ···yn > 0. Citizen 1 is the wealthiest while Citizen n is the poorest.18
18We have "reversed" the ordering so that higher indices correspond to lower wealth classes. This maintains
consistency with the earlier notation in which extension proceeds to citizens with higher indices.
22Payoﬀs each period are given by
ui(ω,e,p)=yi(1 − p)+ω − ce
2
i
All citizens value the public good the same way, however each diﬀers in income, yi.T h e s e
income diﬀerences induce diﬀerences in the way that rich or poor citizens view a tax increase.
For simplicity, assume that the population median is ¯ y, and assume that ym0 > ¯ y.T h i sm e a n s
the initial franchise is restricted. Notice that if ym0 <y 1, then internal class conﬂict exists
within the enfranchised elite. Citizens with wealth levels on the outer fringe of the elite may
have more in common with their neighbors just below them in the income strata than with
other members of the elite.
The transition law for the public good assumes that the public good fully depreciates each
period. Parametrically, it is given by
ω




i ei. Since the public good does not accumulate, decision rules do not vary with
the current level of the good. The ﬁrst order condition gives an individual’s eﬀort choice as a
function of tax p: ei =
δ(pY )θ
2c . As before, the eﬀort and policy rules can be expressed as direct













is a positive constant. Eﬀort levels do not vary with one’s own land
wealth, policy preferences do. If θ<1/2, then preferred tax rates decrease in one’s own
wealth. Wealthier individuals prefer lower taxes. Substituting the policy rule into the eﬀort








where K = δY θ
2c Cθ, another positive constant. Notice that optimal eﬀorts are the same for
all individuals, and depend only on the identity of the median voter. According to σ,e ﬀort
choices decrease in the wealth of the median voter – wealthier voters indirectly induce lower
eﬀort. Since one’s eﬀort contributes public capital to the creation of the public good. franchise
extension is a mechanism by which a current decision maker can, by delegating his authority,
change the level of public capital.
Now observe that
∂σj
∂ym < 0 whenever
∂σj
∂m > 0 since ym is ordered from highest wealth
type to lowest. A franchise extension therefore requires a movement of the median evaluation
23toward lower, rather than higher, land endowment, ym. This means that the inequality in
Proposition 1 is reversed, using yi as an individual’s type. Hence, from Proposition 1, the






Therefore, diﬀerentiating the behavioral rule σ with respect to the state ym, we see that (17)
holds iﬀ θ<1/2.H e n c e ,i fθ<1/2,t h e nµ(y) <y ,f o ra l ly, meaning that the franchise is
extended to successively lower classes in the income strata. Each extension elicits a higher
eﬀort from the citizens. Extension also produces a higher tax rate since taxes and eﬀort are
complementary inputs in the production of public goods.
We now turn to the issue of derivation of an equilibrium franchise rule. Formally, the
current median delegates to a voter with the land endowment ym0, which is chosen to satisfy
the Euler equation ∂Vm






























































































































































The ﬁrst equality in (18) follows by deﬁnition of the Euler equation (9). The second and
third equalities are just algebra. The ﬁnal equality is the ﬁrst order condition. By iterating
































We now verify a "guess" that there exists an equilibrium franchise rule which is linear.






























Note that Equation (20) no longer depends on the wealth, ym, of the decision maker. Hence,
Equation (20) is an equation in one unknown, namely µ, the proposed coeﬃcient of a linear











t − 1) + θ(n − 1)/n
ª
=0





1−2θ(1 − µ)=δθ(n − 1)/n (21)
Hence, any µ ∈ (0,1) which solves (21) is the coeﬃcient in a linear, equilibrium franchise
rule. That is, if µ solves (21), then a FEE enfranchisement rule is given by ym0 = µym.
Since the rule is linear, extensions occur until universal suﬀrage is attained. The linear rule
is illustrated in Figure 2.
To get a better sense of how this rule on land endowment types translates back into
enfranchisement of individuals, let F denote the land distribution. Speciﬁcally, let F(y)
denote the fraction of citizens with wealth levels lower than y,t h a ti s ,F(y)= 1
n|{i : yi <y }|.
Then, the fraction of enfranchised citizens corresponding to pivotal voter type ym is given by




ym0 ym1 ym2 ym3
Figure 2: Linear franchise extension rule
z,f r a c t i o no f
population
enfranchised
zm0 zm1 zm2 zm3
z’
z’=2 ( 1 - F(µζ -1(z)))
Figure 3: An uneven dynamic path of enfranchised fraction of population given wealth distri-
bution F.
26The actual path of enfranchised individuals as a fraction of the population19 is
z(ym),z(µym),z(µ
2ym),...
Figure 3 demonstrates that this law of motion may, in fact, induce an expansion of rights
which is quite uneven.
5.3 Internal Ideological Conﬂict Generates Partial Franchise Ex-
tension
This environment is the same as the one before, except that, instead of wealth diﬀerences,
citizens diﬀer in ideological views toward a public good. While land holdings are now identical
for all citizens, valuations of the public good may diﬀer. Indeed, some citizens may value it
negatively. Thus, there are two groups who have fundamentally conﬂicting views toward the
good, with diﬀering preference intensities within each group. We use this case to compare the
"internal" mechanism for extension with that of Lizzeri and Persico (2003), who model this
type of mechanism as well.
Here, tax revenue is used to provide the public good, but the production is augmented
(reduced) by individual contributions of positive (negative) eﬀort. Worldly examples of this
type of conﬂi c ta r eg i v e ni nS e c t i o n3 .
Formally, preferences are given by
ui(ω,e,p)=y(1 − p) − ce
2
i + αiω
where each land, y, is the same across all citizens, however, αi is a citizen’s utility weight on
the public good. We order the weights so that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ···αJ > 0 >α J+1 ≥ ··· ≥ αn.
Citizens for whom αi > 0 support the provision of the public good, while others suﬀer a utility
cost from it. Assume that
P
i αi > 0 so that, on balance, positive feeling toward the good
is more intense than negative feeling toward it. Assume also that αm0 > 0 so that political
power initially rests with the “positives." For simplicity, assume that the population median
i s0s ot h a tαm0 > 0 represents a restricted franchise. Since these individuals may disagree
about intensity of preference even if they agree that the public good is a "good," internal
conﬂicts that lead to franchise extension are possible.
Each individual can choose costly eﬀort to either increase or decrease the public good
in the subsequent period. Let ei ∈ [−b,b] where b is a large enough bound so that interior
solutions always exist. Hence if ei > 0 is chosen by i then this individual invests in the public
good, whereas if ei < 0,t h e nh ee x e r t se ﬀo r tt or e s i s ts u c hi n v e s t m e n t s .
19In general one would expect the optimal franchise extension rule to depend on the distribution function
F. But in this example, since eﬀorts depend only on the identity of the median voter (see equation 16), the
spill-over, and hence the optimal extension, is independent of F.
27Aggregate eﬀort provision is E =
P
i ei, and the size of the public good is multiplicative
in this eﬀort and tax revenue. Beneﬁts from the public good accrue in the following period,
so the law of motion is given by
ω




i y = ny is the aggregate land in this society. The public good is assumed to
fully depreciate each period. For reasons that will be clear later on, we assume 1/2 >θ>1/4.
If E>0, then tax revenue is used to produce positive amounts of the public good. If, however,
E<0, then revenue is used to produce negative amounts of the good. In such a case, a voter
with a positive marginal evaluation, αm > 0, would prefer a tax rate of 0.
Once again, franchise extension may represent a mechanism by which a decision maker can
commit to a certain tax rate, and the relative strength of preferences now determines whether
this is desirable. For example, if aggregate eﬀort is decreasing in the tax rate (opponents of
the public good dissent more strongly than supporters), then it may be possible to commit
to a lower tax rate and thus increase net eﬀort, by delegating the choice of tax policy to an
agent with a smaller value of α.
Suppose, initially that E>0 is forecast. Then an individual’s eﬀort choice, as a function
of tax p,i sg i v e nb yei =
δαi(pY )θ
2c .A se x p e c t e d ,t h i se ﬀort is positive iﬀ αi > 0.
As before, all decision rules can be expressed as direct functions of type, αi.I ti sn o th a r d












is a positive constant. Substituting the policy rule into the eﬀort





where ¯ K = δY θ
2c ¯ Cθ, another positive constant.
Just as in the previous example, types are ordered so that
∂σj
∂αm < 0 whenever
∂σj
∂m > 0.
A franchise extension therefore requires a movement of the median evaluation toward lower,
rather than higher, weights, αm. This means that inequality in Proposition 1 is reversed, using








∂ei > (<)0 iﬀ αi > 0( αi < 0). Therefore, diﬀerentiating the behavioral
rule (22) with respect to the state αm, we see that (23) holds iﬀ
P
j6=m αj < 0,o r ,i no t h e r
28words,
P
j αj <α m. This implies that extension occurs only if the median lies above the
aggregate welfare weight for the project. But since
P
j αj > 0 then this means, among other
things, that universal suﬀrage is not achieved – extension stops when αm =
P
j αj.
A franchise expansion occurs then if the relative transfer from the “positive" group (less
that of the pivotal voter) is outweighed by the relative gain to the “negative" group when
taxes are lowered due to a smaller median weight on the public good. Roughly, the idea is
that if the dominant group extend the franchise to at least some of the outsiders, then the
tax burden is lower. Consequently, the outsiders do not ﬁght as hard to resist taxation. If P
j αj <α m holds, then, evidently, the drop in outsider eﬀort outweighs the drop in insider
eﬀort.
This "internally driven" explanation appears to be diﬀerent from the "internally driven"
explanation underlying the model by Lizzeri and Persico (LP) (2003). LP consider a random
voting model with two groups of citizens. Preferences over policy are uniform within each
group, but individuals diﬀer along an ideological dimension (which correlates with inherent
policy-independent support for one of two political parties). In their model, the equilibrium
policy choice reﬂects the relative electoral strengths of ideologically neutral voters in both
groups, and is a kind of weighted average of the most preferred policy of each group. Extending
the franchise to members of one of the groups (but not the other) can have the eﬀect of shifting
the equilibrium in the direction of that group’s most preferred policy.20
There are clear diﬀerences between LP’s set up and ours. Initial members of the elite
are, on average, no diﬀerent to the disenfranchised; policy is determined by party-political
competition rather than median voter preferences; and policy choices and franchise extension
are determined by diﬀerent political processes (while in our model they are both determined
by the median voter). However, there are some more fundamental similarities: in particular,
in both models, the economic outcome of the political process is in general not that which
is most preferred by the individual who has the option of extending the franchise (in both
models this is the median voter), and by doing so this individual can move the outcome in a
desirable direction.
In LP, extension eﬀectively strengthens the current median’s voice in the policy decision,
but it comes at a cost of diluting his share of redistributive transfers within the elite. In our
model, extension has beneﬁcial static eﬃciency eﬀects, but these are traded oﬀ against the
costs of loss of control over future decisions.
Unfortunately, an analytical solution to the equilibrium franchise rule in the present model
is not tractable. However, if the discount factor δ is low, then an approximate solution is
given by the one period Euler equation. Replacing ∞ with T =1in the inﬁnite horizon Euler
20Note that the optimality of such an extension is not automatic, since by expanding the size of the elite,
per capita resources are reduced. However, if initially members of the expanding group were receiving no
private transfers, this dilution eﬀect is absent, and they can be made better oﬀ by the expansion.









This solution is consistent with the requirement that
P
j αj ≤ αm.
5.4 External Conﬂict Generates Franchise Extension
Here we recall the "external conﬂict" example in which franchise expansion occurs to head
oﬀ the threat insurrection. Recall that there n − J noblemen and J peasants. The franchise
belongs within the former group. A nobleman i has yi land which generates yi units of potential
consumption each period. Peasants are disenfranchised and possess no land.
Each peasant chooses ej which contributes toward an uprising which, if successful, conﬁs-
cates the nobility’s aggregate return, Y ≡
P
i∈Ayi from land. A nobleman i chooses eﬀort





j∈B ej. Finally, recall that the state variable, ω, is the probability in the current
period that the conﬁscation by the peasants is unsuccessful. The initial state is ω0 ∈ (0,1).
















The negatively serial dependence means that a very likely conﬁscation in the current period
reduces the likelihood in the subsequent period.21
As u c c e s s f u lc o n ﬁscation splits the return Y evenly among the peasants. The peasants
receive a redistributive subsidy chosen by the median voter in the restricted franchise before
the state revolt’s success is known to “buy oﬀ" the peasants.
Each period, the median nobleman chooses a redistributive tax rate p which produces
revenue pY . However, the technology for redistribution is concave – implying that some of
the revenue is potentially lost in the redistributive process. Formally, revenue pY produces
(pY )θ available to be equally distributed to all members of society if there is no conﬁscation.
,W ea s s u m e0 <θ<1 so that if θ is close to one then very little is lost by the redistributive
technology.
Members of nobility have stage utility function






21The idea is that "close calls" today lead to better deterrence tomorrow. Conversely, conﬁscation is more
likely when one’s guard is down.










Using the Euler equations in a ﬁrst order characterization, it can be shown, once again,

















































for noblemen and peasants, respectively.
Using the same techniques as before, it is not hard to show that the franchise is extended











Using the expressions for eﬀort rules above, it is not hard to show that (24) is equivalent to
ym >Y/ n . Hence, a landowner with endowment ym extends the franchise iﬀ his land value is
larger than average.
Despite the stationarity of the equilibrium, its analytical solution is again not tractable.
However, it is instructive to see how the franchise decision aﬀects the trajectory of the state –
the likelihood of insurrection – by changing the private eﬀort of citizens. Figure 4 illustrates
the eﬀect of repeated extensions. The extension eﬀectively lowers the success rate of an
insurrection. When authority is given to a lower income nobleman, the low income nobleman
chooses a larger redistributive tax. This induces a relatively greater eﬀort toward the defense










Figure 4: Path of insurrection likelihoods with and without a one-time franchise extension
6S u m m a r y
This paper introduces a class of dynamic enfranchisement games. In these games, private
decisions of all citizens are explicitly modeled, and voluntary extension of the voter franchise
is a dynamically recursive phenomenon. We know of no other model with these features.
We characterize franchise extension equilibria of these games. These are Markov Perfect
equilibria in which franchise extensions eﬀectively delegate authority to a new median voter in
the subsequent period. The current median is motivated by a desire to permanently change the
policy-relevant private decisions of ordinary citizens. The franchise extension is therefore used
as a commitment device to change private behavior through permanent changes in policy. This
underlying causal mechanism is at the heart of both "internal" and "external" explanations
of observed franchise extensions.
The framework is shown to cover a variety of policy environments. However, the usual
caveats regarding limitations apply. The present environment is deterministic and assumes
simple, single dimensional policies and private decisions. Naturally, the framework can be
extended to include environments with multi-dimensional policies and multi-dimensional pri-
vate decisions. The framework can also be extended to stochastic games – games in which
the transitions are stochastic. Moreover, issues of equilibrium existence are also omitted,
although some of these issue are taken up in a companion paper, Lagunoﬀ (2003). Future
32research might be directed toward computational methods for generating franchise extension
equilibria. It is hoped that a broader understanding of the dynamic enfranchisement game
leads to a broader understanding of the mechanisms that sustain and extend democracy.
7 Appendix A: Proofs of the Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 Let Π admit a ﬁrst order characterization. If the current median


















δ∂ Q / ∂ e 0
i
(25)
Substituting these three equations in the franchise Euler equation, (9), if Π admits a franchise
extension then (12) must hold at m0 = m. To obtain the converse, observe that since Π admits
a ﬁrst order characterization then equation (9) is decreasing, and so if (12) holds at m0 = m,
then by the Envelope Theorem, the solution to (9) entails a choice m0 >m .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 First we show (E-1)-(E-3) are equivalent to the original Euler
equations, (6)-(8). The techniques for showing this are fairly standard. We diﬀerentiate the
















































δ∂ Q / ∂ e i
(27)
Then, substitute (27) for
∂Vi
∂ω0 in the expression (26) and iterate
∂Vi
















































where Λi is deﬁned in the statement of the Proposition.





























Equations (28)-(30) can now be used to obtain the adjusted Euler equations for the pivotal
voter’s policy and franchise decision, and all citizens’ eﬀort decisions, resp. To this end, write















Then substitute (30) in place of ∂Vm
∂m00 in (31) to obtain (E-1), the Euler equation for the pivotal
voter’s policy. Next, recall the Euler equation for the franchise decision expressed in terms of
its explicit decomposition of eﬀects, Equation (9). Using Equation (27) to substitute for ∂Vm
∂ω0
and Equation (30) to substitute for ∂Vm
∂m00 we rewrite Equation (9) to obtain (E-2), the Euler
equation for the franchise decision. Finally, for any ordinary citizen i, we iterate the left side
of (E-2) one period forward. This yields (E-3), the Euler equation for the behavior decision
rule of citizens.
Consequently, a continuously diﬀerentiable, interior proﬁle Π =( σ,µ,ψ) satisﬁes proper-
ties I-III if and only iﬀ these same properties apply to the original Euler equations, (6)-(8).
But these are the conditions for which there exists an equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order
characterization, save for the single crossing property, (ii). As stated earlier, Property IV is
equivalent to the single crossing property when proﬁles are diﬀerentiable.
348 Appendix B: Equilibrium with Internal Ideological
Conﬂict





































































































Recall that since θ>1/4 and
P
i6=m αi < 0,t h e n ∂Vm
∂αm0 is decreasing in αm0,a n ds ot h e
solution to (32) is a maximizer. The optimal franchise extension is, therefore, the median
voter, m0, that solves (32). By iterating forward (32), the inﬁnite horizon Euler equation for
































































































where the third equality comes from the fact that
P
i6=m0 αi = Σ − αm0 w h e r ew ed e ﬁne
Σ ≡
P
j αj. While this expression does not give tractable analytical solution, we do ﬁnd
an approximate solution when δ is small by ﬁnding the solution to the truncated game when
T =1 .22
22Extending this one period problem, we tried to ﬁnd the inﬁnite horizon rule by taking limits of the time-
dependent rules derived in a T period, truncated game. While this approach probably feasible computationally,
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